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I. INTRODUCTION
Policy makers, post-secondary educational institutions, student
groups and the media project an increase in the number and the
value of loans for post-secondary education funded by the federal
and provincial governments in Canada. This article provides a com-
prehensive review of the treatment of government-funded student
loans in bankruptcy in Canada, considering the treatment in bank-
ruptcy of loans funded by the government for a post-secondary
education in a comparative context. In addition to Canada, the
experiences of Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States
and New Zealand are considered, as these jurisdictions have all wit-
nessed a rapid increase in the number of overcommitted debtors,
bankruptcies and reform to existing consumer bankruptcy legisla-
tion and policy over the last two decades. While the bankruptcy
systems and funding structures of post-secondary education of
these countries differ in certain important respects, each share some
historical, institutional or procedural features with the Canadian
bankruptcy regime and each jurisdiction has adopted some form of
government-funded or guaranteed student loan program. In the last
two decades increasing numbers of students in all of these juris-
dictions have pursued post-secondary education, tuition fees have
risen, and government-funded student loans have replaced govern-
ment grants as the primary means for lower and middle income
students to fund post-secondary education.
A review of the current position and historical trajectory of the
treatment of government student loans in bankruptcy in Canada,
Australia, England, the United States and New Zealand suggests
that all five jurisdictions are converging on a model where the
bankruptcy system provides limited to no relief for loans transact-
ed under a program funded or guaranteed by a government unit to
fund a post-secondary education. This article argues that the two
key justifications relied upon to justify this model - student abuse
of the bankruptcy process and the need to protect the public inter-
est - are unsubstantiated. The evidence from Canada and from all
of the other jurisdictions under review demonstrates that students
are not abusing the bankruptcy process. The evidence also demon-
strates that, with the exception of the United States, government-
funded student loans are the only government debts that are except-
ed from the bankruptcy discharge. This is contrary to the trend in
every jurisdiction under review to remove the special treatment
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previously accorded to Crown debts. Further, given the growth of
securitization markets for student loans, private investors in fact are
benefiting from the special treatment accorded government-funded
student loans in bankruptcy, though such special treatment is justi-
fied as necessary to protect the public interest.
Because the justifications for the current exception to the bank-
ruptcy discharge for government-funded student loans are not well
founded, this article does not advocate tweaking the waiting period
for the exception to discharge for government-funded student loans.
Rather, reform efforts should be directed at the substantive and pro-
cedural aspects of the exception. The process for making decisions
about these features must be informed by empirical data. Adopting
this approach, the article suggests that the current exception to dis-
charge for government-funded student loans in Canada should be
abolished. The current system, which places the onus on the bank-
rupt to apply to the court and demonstrate good faith and financial
hardship, is ineffective due to procedural obstacles relating to the
onus and substantive obstacles relating to the role of bankruptcy
registrars. The onus should be placed on the government to oppose
a discharge where the bankrupt has not experienced financial hard-
ship in repaying government-funded student loans and/or where
there is evidence of bad faith.
Part II of this article outlines the basic structure of government-
funded student loans in Canada, the treatment of these loans in
bankruptcy, and recent proposals for reform. Part III outlines both
the measures that led to a pattern of convergence in the treatment of
government-funded student loans in bankruptcy in the common law
jurisdictions under review and the triggers for these measures.
Within this comparative context, the soundness of the recommen-
dations generated from two recent Canadian government reports on
bankruptcy and the provisions found in Statute c. 47 are considered
in Part IV together with recommendations and issues that need to be
further explored in considering these proposals and new legislation.
II. CANADIAN CONTEXT
A central facet of the Canadian consumer bankruptcy system in
its current form is an individual's right to a "fresh start" provided
by the bankruptcy discharge. Following bankruptcy an individual
is free from most of her debts and at the same time retains her
experiences, knowledge and values, often referred to as human
2006]
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capital,' which can contribute to her becoming a productive
member of society again. However, a number of exceptions to the
bankruptcy discharge are provided for under existing legislation.2
These exceptions apply to both bankruptcies and consumer
proposals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). While a
literature has developed around the justifications for a mandatory,
or non-waivable, bankruptcy discharge, a comprehensive normative
theory of the appropriate scope of the discharge and accompany-
ing exceptions has eluded commentators for some time. A common
explanation for this list of exceptions is that they all concern fraud
or similar misbehaviour against creditors and excluding these
categories of bankrupts from discharge is intended to deter this
conduct. However, the list excludes a large number of "wrong-
doers", such as bankrupts who have committed torts other than the
three that are identified by the act. In particular, bankrupts who
owe tax and non-tax debts to the government, such as unemploy-
ment insurance overpayments or small business loans, are not
included on the list. There is no obvious rationale for this list of
debts.
Government Student Loans3 are found on the existing list of
exceptions to discharge.4 The inclusion of Government Student
Loans was justified on the basis that without the exception to dis-
charge, a significant number of students were blatantly manipulating
the bankruptcy system by finishing their post-secondary studies, and
then going bankrupt to erase their Government Student Loans before
profiting from professions such as law or medicine.
1. "You cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health or values the
way it is possible to move financial and physical assets while the owner stays put."
Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special
Reference to Education, National Bureau of Economic Research (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993), p. 16.
2. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1) (IA). The debts iden-
tified in this section include fines imposed by a court; alimony, maintenance or sup-
port payments owing; damages awards arising from civil proceedings for bodily harm,
sexual assault or wrongful death; debts and liabilities arising out of fraud; and govern-
ment student loans.
3. A "Government Student Loan" is any debt or obligation in respect of a loan made
under the Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23, the Canada Student
Financial Assistance Act, S.C. 1994, c. 28 or any enactment of a province that provides
for loans or guarantees of loans to students. This includes loans made by private banks
participating in government student loan programs.
4. BIA, supra, footnote 2, s. 178(l)(g).
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1. Overview of Government Student Loans5
In Canada, students who cannot afford the cost of a post-secondary
education rely on a range of credit products to fund their studies.
Many students (and parents) use lines of credit, extended mort-
gages, private loans and credit cards to fund their education. The
only form of student credit that is not based on a positive past-
credit history, and accordingly is most accessible to students from
low and middle-income families, is a Government Student Loan.
Government Student Loans are issued based on assessed student
need, and do not charge interest while students are engaged in part-
or full-time studies. In 2003, 42% of all post-secondary students
relied on federal Government Student Loans.6 Of these students,
58.8% were women and 41.2% were men.' Approximately 16.8%
of the student borrowers represented high-need part-time students,
high-need students with permanent disabilities, females pursuing
doctoral studies or students with dependents.'
Government Student Loans are provided to students based on
federal-provincial partnerships in nine provinces and in the Yukon.'
In these participating jurisdictions, provincial and territorial student
assistance offices administer the front end of both provincial and
federal student loans. Generally, students hold two separate
Government Student Loans: a provincial loan and a federal loan.
However, pursuant to Canada-Provincial Integrated Student Loan
Agreements,10 four provinces - Ontario, Saskatchewan, New
Brunswick and Newfoundland - have integrated their student loan
5. This introduction to the Canadian context for government student loans draws heavi-
ly from S. Ben-Ishai, "One Paradox of the Bankruptcy Fresh Start: Government
Student Loans" (2005), Ann. Insolv. Rev. 436.
6. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Student Loans Program Annual
Report 2002-2003 (2004), online at <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/hip/cslp/publica-
tions/12_puAnnualReport20022003.pdf> at p. 2 (Annual Report).
7. Ibid., at p. 3.
8. Ibid., at p. 20. These are students who are eligible to receive Canada Study Grants
(CSGS) from the federal government. Information on the specific percentage of students
falling in each category is not provided in the Canada Student Loans Program 2002-
2003 Annual Report. CSGs are non-repayable and accordingly a detailed discussion of
their operation is beyond the scope of this article.
9. Quebec, Northwest Territories and Nunavut have opted out of the federal student loan
program and receive alternative payments to operate their own programs.
10. Edulinx Canada Corporation, online at Canada-Provincial Integrated Student Loans
<http://www.edulinx.ca/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=57&ltemid
=58> (date accessed: July 19, 2005).
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programs with the federal program such that students receive only
one loan funded by both the federal and provincial governments.
The integrated loan is subject to the terms of the federal student
loan program.
The federal government directly finances all federal student
loans issued on or after August 1, 2000 through the National
Student Loans Service Centre (NSLSC)." Provincial or territorial
student assistance offices review both federal and provincial loan
applications, confirm eligibility, assess financial need, and deter-
mine the amount of funding students will receive. The NSLSC
processes loan documents, arranges for loan funds to be deposited
to the student's bank account, keeps track of the total amount of
the loan throughout the student's studies and the amount she will
have to repay, sets up a loan repayment schedule, and administers
debt-relief programs. Under the current scheme, there is no maxi-
mum repayment period, but a typical repayment period is 9.5
years.1 2 Students are entitled to a six-month grace period after leav-
ing part or full-time studies before having to make payments on
their loan. 3 However, interest accrues on the loan during the grace
period.'4 Following the grace period, for provinces that have not
reached Canada-Provincial Integrated Student Loan Agreements,
students are required to consolidate their provincial and federal
11. The government, through the NSLSC, contracts out the administration of the program,
including debt relief options, to two private service providers. Edulinx administers
loans issued to students attending not-for-profit universities and colleges and BDP
administers loans issued to students enrolled in training programs offered by for-
profit companies. Nelnet, Inc. acquired Edulinx from the Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (cIBc) for an undisclosed price on November 30, 2004. Edulinx services
approximately one million Government Student Loans totaling approximately $7 billion.
The company was originally established in 1999. cIsc became the sole owner of
Edulinx in January 2002. A significant part of Nelnet's business is the securitization of
education finance assets: see online at <www.shareholder.com/Common/Edgar/
1258602/930413-05-3765/05-00.pdf>. Edulinx sub-contracts with Canada Post to
handle the processing of loan documents and the depositing of funds into students'
accounts. See Canadian Federation of Students, Membership Advisory, "Latest
Changes to the Canada Student Loan Program" (March 2001), online at Membership
Advisory <http://www.cfs-fcee.calhtml/english/research/factsheets/ma-200103-
cslp.pdf> (date accessed: July 20, 2005) at p. 1 (Membership Advisory).
12. Interview of L. Wanczycki, Policy Advisor (June 27, 2005) Canada Student Loan
Program, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. This information was
not available on the NSLSC website or guide.
13. Canada Student Loans Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-23, s. 5.
14. Ibid., s. 4(2)(b).
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student loans and to decide on a fixed or floating rate of interest to
repay their loans.' 5
Following the 1998 federal budget, the government introduced a
number of forms of relief, which are still in place today, for students
having trouble repaying their Government Student Loans due to
financial hardship. Prior to regulatory changes enacted in 2004 and
2005, these options were extremely limited, only available to
borrowers with loans in good standing and imposing very low
income thresholds. The 2004 Amendments replaced the good
standing requirement for obtaining relief with more lenient specific
eligibility requirements and also increased the amount of available
relief.6 The 2005 Amendments raised the income thresholds for
obtaining relief by 5% and also further increased the amount of
available relief.'7 While the 2004 and 2005 Amendments have
extended eligibility and increased the amount of assistance provid-
ed through the government's debt relief programs, the requirements
for obtaining relief remain complex and the income thresholds
remain relatively low. It is still too early to determine the impact of
these amendments.
Interest relief represents the central form of relief for debtors
with Government Student Loans.'8 Interest does not accrue while a
borrower receives interest relief. This form of relief is based on
gross family income, family size, and the principal owing on stu-
dent loans. Interest relief is typically granted for six-month periods,
up to a maximum of 30 months, throughout the lifetime of the loan.
Extended interest relief,'9 which is available to students who are
unable to make payments within five years of leaving school,
15. The current federal fixed interest rate is prime plus 5%, while the floating rate is prime
plus 2.5%. Students have the option to change to a fixed rate at any time. See Human
Resources Development Canada (HRDC), Evaluation of the Canada Student Loans
Program, "Introduction" (February 23, 1999), online at Human Resources
Development Canada <http:/www 1 .hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/pls/edd/CSL_55028.htm> (date
accessed: April 21, 2005) at para. 11.
16. so J2004-120 (effective May 11, 2004) (2004 Amendments).
17. soRJ2005-152 (effective August 1, 2005) (2005 Amendments).
18. Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, s. 7 and Canada Student Financial
Assistance Regulations: soR/95-329, s. 19. See also National Student Loans Service
Centre, online at Integrated Interest Relief <http://www.canlearn.ca/NSLsc/
support/new/nlwhanew3.cfm?langnslsc=en> (date accessed: April 25, 2005) (Integrated
Interest Relief).
19. Canada Student Financial Assistance Act, ibid., and Canada Student Financial
Assistance Regulations, ibid., ss. 19-20. See also Integrated Interest Relief, ibid.
2006]
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extends interest relief benefits up to an additional 24 months. The
government may also agree to a revision of terms ° and extend the
loan repayment period or reduce monthly payments for a short
period of time.
Two other "last resort" forms of debt relief are available to
students: the Debt Reduction in Repayment Program and the
Permanent Disability Benefit. Under the Debt Reduction in
Repayment Program, where a student has exhausted all other
avenues and has been out of school for five years, she may apply to
have her loan principal reduced. If approved for the program, she
could be eligible to receive an initial reduction of up to $10,000; if
she continues to experience financial difficulty, she may apply for a
second and a third reduction in amounts of up to $10,000 and
$6,000 respectively." The total availability of $26,000 in debt
reduction represents an increase from the $10,000 maximum in
place prior to the 2004 and 2005 Amendments. In order to qualify
for benefits under the Debt Reduction in Repayment Program, a
student must have used all 30 months of benefits under the interest
relief plan; must be in good standing with the NSLSC and/or her
financial institution, with not more than two months in arrears
owing on her debt; and her loan payments must exceed a given per-
centage of her income, as established by the Debt Reduction in
Repayment Income Table appended to the Canada Student
Financial Assistance Regulations.2 If a student has a permanent dis-
ability, and is experiencing exceptional financial hardship in repay-
ing her loan due to the disability, she may also qualify for the
Permanent Disability Benefit, where all or a portion of her
Government Student Loan is forgiven. 3
20. National Student Loans Service Centre, online at Revision of Terms <http://www.can-
learn.ca/nslsc/repay/On/nlObtRepAss.cfm?LANGNSLSc=en&IT=PBuLic&row=3> (date
accessed: April 25, 2005).
21. Canada Student Financial Assistance Regulations, supra, footnote 18, s. 42.1. See also
National Student Loans Service Centre, online at Debt Reduction in Repayment
<http://www.canlearn.ca/nslsc/repay/On/nlObtRepAss.cfm?LANGNSLsc=en&T=
PUBLIc&row=5> (date accessed: April 25, 2005).
22. Ibid.
23. Canada Student Financial Assistance Regulations, ibid., s. 43.1(1)(b). See also
National Student Loans Service Centre, online at Permanent Disability Benefit
<http://www.canlearn.canssc/repay/On/nlObtRepAss.cfm?LANGNSLSc=en&T=
PUBUc&row=6> (date accessed: April 25, 2005).
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For provinces that have not reached Canada-Provincial
Integrated Student Loan Agreements, there are some variations
between the federal debt relief options and the provincial debt relief
options for repayment of Government Student Loans. For example,
under the Alberta Loan Relief Program, enacted on August 1, 2001,
students who receive more than $5,000 per year in combined
Alberta and federal loans may qualify for relief. Financial assis-
tance above $5,000 may be provided as a loan relief benefit, which
is not repayable.24 In Manitoba, the maximum amount of debt
reduction is $6,667 compared to $26,000 now available for federal
loans.25 In Nova Scotia, students must apply for debt reduction with-
in three months of graduation. The percentage of debt reduction is
graduated based on completed year of study and ranges from 15%
to 45%. In addition, borrowers may qualify for an employment
bonus award or repayment bonus award and receive an additional
25% or 10%, respectively, of the amount of debt reduction they
received at graduation.26
Until May 11, 2004, when the 2004 Amendments came into
effect, students who filed a proceeding under the BIA were not eli-
gible for new federal Government Student Loans and they could not
obtain the benefits of the federal government's debt relief programs
for existing Government Student Loans. A student who files a pro-
ceeding under the BIA may now be eligible to obtain Government
Student Loans for a maximum of three years, provided she remains
in the same program of study and continues in full-time status, and
she may also be eligible for the government's debt relief programs.27
2. Proposals and Reforms
In the last five years a number of proposals have been put for-
ward to increase the number and the value of student loans provided
24. Edulinx Canada Corporation, online at Repayment Assistance - Provincial and
Territorial Loans <http://www.edulinx.conindex.phpoption=com-content&task=
view&id=55&Itemid=64> (date accessed: July 20, 2005) (Edulinx).
25. Ibid.
26. Nova Scotia Department of Education - Student Loans (Student Assistance), online
at Debt Reduction Program Information <http://studentloans.ednet.ns.ca/student-
debt reduction.shtml> (date accessed: July 20, 2005).
27. 2004 Amendments, supra, footnote 16. See also Office of the Superintendent of
Bankruptcy Canada, "Notice of Changes to the Regulations Under the Canada Student
Loan Program", online at Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http://strate-
gis.ic.gc.calepic/internetlinbsf-osb.nsf/enlbr01439e.html> (date accessed: August 4,
2005).
2006]
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by the federal and provincial governments as well as to amend the
current legislation pertaining to the treatment of these loans in
bankruptcy.
The most recent recommendation has flowed from a report com-
missioned by the Ontario government, in response to the 2004
Ontario budget's commitment to review the design and funding of
postsecondary education in Ontario. Premier Dalton McGuinty
appointed the Honourable Bob Rae as the advisor to the Premier
and the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, who with
the support of a seven-member advisory panel, was asked to advise
on two issues: the design of a publicly funded postsecondary sys-
tem and funding models for this system. The government released
the Rae Review in February 2005.28 The report, which has attracted
significant attention around the country, recommended that the
current freeze on tuition fees in place in Ontario should be lifted and
that individual institutions should be free to set their own tuition.
29
28. B. Rae, Ontario A Leader in Learning: Report & Recommendations (February 2005)
(Rae Review).
29. See, for example, a sample of the numerous newspaper articles on the topic following
the release of the Rae Review: "Rae Review's Funding Flaw", The Toronto Star,
February 21, 2005, p. A17; I. Robertson, "Students Fight Fees; Even Rae Comes
Under Fire", The Toronto Sun, February 4, 2005, p. 4; B. Whitwham, "Summerlee
Doesn't Expect Surprises in Rae Review", The Guelph Mercury, February 5, 2005, p.
Al; P. George, "Value of Universities Reflected in Many Ways", The Hamilton
Spectator, February 5, 2005. See also Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Excellence
Accessibility Responsibility: Report of the Advisory Panel on Future Directions for
Postsecondary Education by D.C. Smith (Chair) (1996), online at Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities <http://www.
edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/reports/futuree.html#sharing> (date accessed: July 20,
2005). Historically, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island,
Saskatchewan and Alberta have not regulated tuition fees. New Brunswick and
Manitoba occasionally imposed tuition regulations. Prior to the 1990s, Ontario, British
Columbia and Quebec regulated tuition fees. See Canadian Federation of Students,
Fact Sheet 1998 5:5, "Deregulation of Tuition Fees" (November 1998), online at
Deregulation of Tuition Fees <http://www.cfsontario.calpolicylfactsheetslfs-5(5)-
deregulation.pdf> (date accessed: July 20, 2005), pp. 3-4. Similar to Ontario, British
Columbia deregulated tuition fees in 2002. However, in the 2005 Throne Speech, the
government announced that it would be re-regulating tuition fees, after fees more than
doubled during the period of deregulation. Tuition fees will be capped at the rate of
inflation. See Canadian Federation of Students, Media Release, "Campbell Second-
Guesses BC Tuition Fee Policy" (February 9, 2005), online at Media
<http:/laction.web.ca/homelcfslen-alerts.shtml?x=72136> (date accessed: July 20,
2005). The Ontario example, which is demonstrative of national tuition fee trends and
debates, is used to develop the context for the focus of this report on student loans in
bankruptcy. This article focuses on the Ontario context because it recently provoked
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The position of the Rae Review was justified by a condition prece-
dent for tuition fees to be raised: more students should be eligible
for government-subsidized financial assistance."
The status of Government Student Loans in bankruptcy also
received significant attention in the two recent Canadian govern-
ment reports on bankruptcy: the Personal Insolvency Task Force
Report published in December 200231 and the Senate Report pub-
lished in November 2003.32 Both reports advocated reforms to
address the current exception to the bankruptcy discharge for
Government Student Loans, which provides for limited relief on
financial hardship grounds, on an all-or-nothing basis, following a
costly court application that is only possible 10 years after the bank-
rupt or former bankrupt has ceased to be a full- or part-time
student.33 Both reports referenced empirical data34 that detailed the
dire financial circumstances of bankrupts with student loans rela-
tive to those without student loans and demonstrated that such
bankrupts were generally not high-income professionals attempting
to defraud the system. Further, the reports indicated that the
existing legislation was ill-equipped to address intervening life
events such as illness, disability and family breakdown, which often
significant national scrutiny. A detailed review of tuition trends around the country is
beyond the scope of this article.
30. Rae Review, supra, footnote 28, at p. 23.
31. Office of Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, Personal Insolvency Task Force
Final Report (August 2002), online at <http://www.strategis.ic.gc.calepic/
internet/inbsf-osb.nsf/en/h_br01 225e.html> (date accessed: August 5, 2005).
32. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Debtors and
Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Ottawa, 2003), online at Senate of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/bank-e/rep-e/bankruptcy-
e.pdf> (date accessed: August 4, 2005).
33. Where a student returns to school after the 10-year period has commenced, the clock
is restarted.
34. See S. Schwartz, "The Dark Side of Student Loans: Debt Burden, Default, and
Bankruptcy" (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 317, for a summary of this data at p. 329:
The economic situation of all those declaring bankruptcy suggests that bankruptcy is
used primarily as a last resort. The economic situation of those seeking bankruptcy
protection with student loans among their debts, or whose student loans were criti-
cal in their bankruptcy, is even worse than the already desperate situation of the
whole group. To be sure, they are younger and have more education, but they have
lower annual household income and lower monthly income at the time of filing for
bankruptcy. More than 40 per cent had received income assistance in the two years
previous to filing, and about 30 per cent had received unemployment insurance. A
surprisingly large portion - more than one-third - had occupations that were
unskilled.
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accounted for unpaid Government Student Loans and warranted a
fresh start. To this end, both reports recommended that the excep-
tion to discharge for Government Student Loans should be amend-
ed to apply only to situations where it had been less than five years
since the bankrupt completed full- or part-time studies that the loans
had funded. As well, both reports recommended that courts be pro-
vided with the discretion to confirm the discharge of all or a portion
of a Government Student Loan before the five-year period had
lapsed, in cases where the bankrupt could establish that the burden
of maintaining the liability for some or all of the debt would result
in financial hardship.
The 10-year exception to discharge has also been met with a
great deal of criticism by bankruptcy trustees and student groups.
Bankruptcy trustees, concerned with the impact the 10-year excep-
tion has on their ability to come up with a reasonable solution to
debtors' financial distress, have criticized the exception as unduly
harsh.35 Student groups supported what was ultimately an unsuc-
cessful legal action to challenge the exception under the equality
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.36
In the last year, two bills have been introduced that attempt to
vary the timing of the exception to discharge for Government
Student Loans. On October 20, 2004,37 Alexa McDonough (Halifax,
NDP) introduced Bill C-236,38 which would have amended the BIA to
"reduce, from ten to two years after a bankrupt leaves school, the
period of time during which an order of discharge does not release
the bankrupt from the reimbursement of his or her student loan"."
35. See for example, Hoyes and Michalos, online at Canada and Ontario Student Loans in
Bankruptcy <http://www.hoyes.com/studentloan-bankruptcy-Canada.htm> (date
accessed: August 4, 2005).
36. See Canadian Federation of Students, "Bankruptcy Charter Challenge" (April 2005),
online at Campaigns & Lobbying <http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/html/english/
campaigns/bankruptcy-charter.php> (date accessed: April 26, 2005). The decision
was released on June 30, 2005: Chenier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 CanLIlI
23125, 12 C.B.R. (5th) 173, 131 C.R.R. (2d) 361 (Ont. S.C.). Justice Sedgwick held
that the exception was not based on an individual's "needs, merits or capacities". He
was not convinced that the exception does anything more than distinguish between
Government Student Loan debtors and other debtors on the grounds of the nature of
the debt. Justice Sedgwick described outstanding Government Student Loans as
reflecting an economic condition and not a personal characteristic.
37. House of Commons Debates, 012 (October 20, 2004) at p. 1525 (Ms Alexa McDonough).
38. Bill C-236, An Act to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (student loan), 1st
Sess., 38th Parl., 2004.
39. House of Commons Debates, 065 (February 25, 2005) at p. 1300 (Ms. Alexa
McDonough).
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The bill was subsequently defeated in a motion held on April 13,
2005 40
Most recently, on June 3, 2005, the federal government, in Bill C-
55, unveiled a package of long-awaited amendments to Canadian
bankruptcy legislation entitled An Act to establish the Wage Earner
Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make
consequential amendments to other Acts.4 ' Bill C-55 made its way
through the parliamentary process on an expedited basis and
received Royal Assent on November 25, 2005, and is now Statute
c. 47.42 Statute c. 47 reduces the period for the exception to discharge
for Government Student Loans from 10 years to seven years follow-
ing the completion of full- or part-time studies.43 The statute also
reduces the period of time before an application for relief from the
exception to discharge can be made from 10 years to five years."
Similar to Bill C-236 and the government reports that have recom-
mended changes to the timing of the exception, Statute c. 47 does
not provide a principled amendment to the substance of the excep-
tion. For example, the statute leaves intact the requirement that a
40. House of Commons Debates, 081 (April 13, 2005) at p. 1525 (Hon. Peter Milliken).
41. Bill C-55, An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005 (first read-
ing in House of Commons June 3, 2005).
42. See Debates of Senate, 142 (November 25, 2005) at p. 1100. The Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy reported on the process:
Given the extraordinary circumstances that existed with the impending dissolution
of Parliament, the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
requested and received the Government's assurance that Bill C-55 would not be pro-
claimed in force prior to June 30, 2006, at the earliest. It is expected that as soon as
possible in 2006, the Government will refer the matter to the Standing Committee
for study. Following its review last week, the Standing Committee reported that it
expects to receive from Industry Canada officials a list of legislative and regulatory
changes to improve Bill C-55 and Canada's insolvency regime. The Standing
Committee further reported that it expects to provide an opportunity to all stake-
holders to share their views on key aspects of the legislation. The exact scope of pos-
sible amendments is as yet unknown. It is clear, however, that any additional review
by the Senate may impact on the timing of the coming into force of the legislation.
See Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, "Bill C-55 Receives Royal
Assent", online at <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inbsf-osb.nsf/en/br01561e.
html> (date accessed: December 8, 2005).
43. Ibid., s. 107(2): "Subparagraph 178(l)(g)(ii) of the Act is replaced by the following:
(ii) within seven years after the date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-
time student."
44. Ibid., s. 107(3):
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bankrupt submit a judicial application for relief following the waiting
period, in order for any relief from the exception to be granted.
III. MEASURES TOWARDS CONVERGENCE AND TRIGGERS
1. More Restrictive Discharge Provisions
In Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, students have met with increasing difficulty in discharging
their government-funded student loans. Only in New Zealand and,
in a more limited way, Australia, can government-funded student
loans still be discharged in bankruptcy.
Of these countries, the United States was the first to create an
exception to discharge for government-funded or guaranteed
student loans. In 1976, Congress enacted the nondischargeability
provision in response to claims that recent graduates were abusing
the bankruptcy system by eradicating their debts immediately upon
graduation.45 Originally, there were two exceptions to the nondis-
chargeability provision that applied to student loans: a debtor could
discharge the loans in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding if five
years had lapsed after the loan matured or if the debtor could estab-
lish undue hardship.46 These exceptions were included in response
to criticisms regarding the lack of empirical evidence of abuse and
to preserve the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code. 7 The five-year excep-
tion was later extended to seven years, but was subsequently abol-
ished by The Higher Education Amendments in 1998.8 Today, the
only remaining relief from the exception to discharge for student
loans is the undue hardship provision. This is the case for both a
Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 proceeding. Most recently, on April 20,
2005, the government passed an amendment that extends the
Subsection 178(1. 1) of the Act is replaced by the following: (1.1) At any time after
five years after a bankrupt who has a debt referred to in paragraph 1(g) ceases to be
a full- or part-time student, as the case may be, under the applicable Act or enactment,
the court, may on application, order that subsection (1) does not apply to the debt if
the court is satisfied that (a) the bankrupt has acted in good faith in connection with
the bankrupt's liabilities under the debt; and (b) the bankrupt has and will continue
to experience financial difficulty to such an extent that the bankrupt will be unable
to pay the debt.
45. B. Hennessy, "The Partial Discharge of Student Loans: Breaking Apart the All or
Nothing Interpretation of 11 U.S.C. 523 (A)(8)" (2004), 77 Temp. L. Rev. 71 at p. 73.
46. Ibid., at p. 118.
47. Ibid.
48. C. Morea, "Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy - It is Time for a Unified
Equitable Approach" (1999), 7 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 193 at note 2.
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nondischargeability provision.4 9 While the provision previously
applied only to government and non-profit student loans, it now
includes student loans issued by for-profit entities." The United
States is the only jurisdiction under review to have extended the
application of the exception to discharge to non-government
funded or guaranteed student loans.
The U.S. Congress did not define what constitutes "undue hard-
ship", but rather left it open to the judiciary to construct an appro-
priate definition. The American courts have developed increasingly
complex tests to determine what constitutes "undue hardship" that
have provided limited relief to applicants. According to Jennifer
Frattini, "the formation of various stringent judicial interpretations
of 'undue hardship'... have the effect of undermining the first goal
of bankruptcy - providing the honest, overburdened debtor with a
fresh start".' A recent empirical study of the 261 reported undue
hardship decisions issued by U.S. bankruptcy courts, within the 10-
year period spanning from 1994 to 2003, demonstrated few statisti-
cally significant differences in the factual circumstances of debtors
granted a discharge as opposed to those who did not receive this
relief.2 Less concerned with the frequency with which relief was
granted, the authors of this empirical study focused on the judicial
process and the small number of debtors who had the financial
wherewithal to litigate a claim of undue hardship. 3 The authors
observed that nearly half of the discharge determinations analyzed
concluded that failing to discharge a debtor's student loans would
impose undue hardship on the debtor. 4 However, the authors criti-
cized the haphazard fashion in which courts determined whether a
debtor's circumstances supported a claim of undue hardship."
In Canada, in 1997, Government Student Loans were made
nondischargeable in bankruptcy if the bankrupt had been out of
49. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23 at 59 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)).
50. Ibid.
51. J. Frattini, "The Dischargeability of Student Loans: An Undue Burden?" (2001), 17
Bank. Dev. J. 537 at p. 541.
52. R. Pardo and M. Lacey, "Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt" (Tulane University School of Law,
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school for less than two years.56 A debtor could apply to the court
for a discharge of her debts after the two-year period if she could
demonstrate that she had acted in good faith and could not repay her
loan due to financial difficulty. 7 Government Student Loans
incurred outside the two-year period were treated in the same way
as other unsecured debts and discharged. In 1998, this two-year
exception to discharge was increased to 10 years, making it even
more difficult for students to discharge their student loans. 8 A
critique similar to that levelled against the manner in which U.S.
courts have dealt with judicial applications for relief has been put
forward in Canada. 9
The most recent jurisdiction to exempt government-funded
student loans from the bankruptcy discharge is the United
Kingdom. In 2004, the United Kingdom enacted the Higher
Education Act 2004,60 which removed government-funded student
loans from the bankruptcy realm.6" Prior to 2004, student loans were
provable and could be discharged in bankruptcy.
2. Government Student Loans Not Provable
In Australia, prior to the introduction of the Higher Education
Support Act 2003, government-funded semester and accumulated
student loan debts were provable but not extinguished in bankruptcy.
With the introduction of the Higher Education Support Act 2003,
these loans were classified as non-provable. Bills Digest No. 159,
pertaining to the Higher Education Funding Amendment Bill 2001,
states that since the Commonwealth retains the prospect of repay-
ment because these loans are not extinguished in bankruptcy, the
government should not be able to claim a share of the sale of the
bankrupt's assets and thus reduce the amount available to other
creditors who have no future hope of repayment.62 Accordingly,
subsequent reforms to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 that reference the
Higher Education Support Act 2003 exempt semester and accumu-
lated student debts completely from the operation of bankruptcy.
56. An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 1997, c. 12 (Bill C-5).
57. Ibid.
58. Budget Implementation Act, 1998, S.C. 1998, c. 21, s. 103, amending the BIA.
59. Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 5.
60. Higher Education Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 8, s. 42 (hereinafter HEA).
61. Ibid.
62. Higher Education Funding Amendment Bill 2001 (Cth.), Bill Digest No. 159 (2001).
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The treatment of assessment debts remains unchanged; they are
provable and extinguished in bankruptcy.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, one rationale advanced by the
House of Commons Standing Committee on March 9, 2004, in
support of the treatment of government-funded student loans under
the Higher Education Funding Act 2004, was that classifying
student loans as non-provable would make available more money to
other creditors.63
3. Perceived Abuses of the Bankruptcy System
In all of the countries under review, the most influential rationale
for the introduction of more restrictive discharge provisions regarding
student loans was the claim that the bankruptcy process was
susceptible to abuse by students who were eager to rid themselves
of their loans prior to embarking on lucrative careers. A further
trend is that these allegations of abuse have rarely been substantiated.
In the United Kingdom Margaret Hodge, the former Minister of
Lifelong Learning and Higher Education, initiated and supported
legislative reforms that effectively eliminated bankruptcy as an
option for debt relief for outstanding government-funded student
loans, based on apprehension of potential abuse. She was concerned
that students viewed bankruptcy as an easy route to avoid repaying
student loans.' On March 9, 2004, the House of Commons
Standing Committee acknowledged that the number of students
claiming bankruptcy had increased dramatically, from eight in 1992
to 899 in 2003.65 However, the committee further acknowledged
that the number of students claiming bankruptcy amounted to less
than 1% of the total number of students with government-funded
loans.66These statistics did not support the contention that the bank-
ruptcy process was in jeopardy of being abused. Nevertheless, the
House of Commons Standing Committee advanced this rationale in
support of the recent legislative reforms.
Similarly, in 1976, the U.S. Congress enacted a nondischarge-
ability provision to "ensure the viability of student loan programs
by preventing students with fraudulent intentions from deliberately
abusing the bankruptcy system by incurring massive loan obligations,
63. U.K., H.C., Standing Committee Debates, col. 578 (March 9, 2004) (Mr. Willis).
64. Ibid., col. 572.
65. Ibid.,col.571.
66. Ibid., col. 577.
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obtaining a free education, then filing a petition to have all their
debts wiped out".67 Opponents of the nondischargeability provision
for government student loans noted that there was little empirical
evidence of abuse. The cases of fraudulent abuse were rare, but
were sensationalized by the media."8 A study by the General
Accounting Office, conducted prior to the implementation of
s. 523(a)(8), revealed that only a fraction of 1% of matured student
loans had been discharged in bankruptcy.69
In Canada, similar concerns about abuse prompted the introduc-
tion of the two-year nondischargeability provision for student loans.
For example, Mr. Brian Tobin, during Proceedings of the Standing
Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, stated, "We
are trying to avoid situations where someone declares bankruptcy
simply to get rid of their student loan and then finds a job."7 No
empirical data has been put forward to justify this contention.
Rather, empirical data has demonstrated that this is not the case."
With the introduction of the Higher Education Loan Programme
(HELP) in Australia, a greater number of students had access to
student loans. There was a fear that as more students acquired loans
the instances of abuse would increase.72 Therefore, one rationale for
exempting semester and accumulated student debts from the bank-
ruptcy process was to mitigate these potential instances of abuse.73
Again, no empirical data was put forward to justify this concern.
In New Zealand, the Student Loan Scheme was enacted to
support the government's social and economic goals for higher edu-
cation. Since 1990, education policy has required students to con-
tribute more to the costs of their education. The shift toward greater
student contribution is based on the increased demand for higher
education, increased costs incurred to meet this demand and pres-
sure to reduce government spending. An argument is also advanced
that the student, who receives the benefits from higher education,
should be required to pay more for those benefits.74 However,
67. Frattini, supra, footnote 51, at p. 541.
68. Hennessy, supra, footnote 45, at p. 74.
69. Ibid.
70. Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade
and Commerce, "Issue 13 - Evidence" (November 4, 1996) (Mr. Tobin).
71. Schwartz, supra, footnote 34.
72. Interview of B. Cruickshanks, Insolvency and Trustee Services Australia (May 31,
2005).
73. Ibid.
74. New Zealand, "Student Loans and Funding for Tertiary Education" (November 5,
1999), Parliamentary Library.
[Vol. 44
Student Loans, Debt & Bankruptcy 229
punitive aspects remain in the New Zealand bankruptcy process:
the inability to obtain funding under the Student Loan Scheme, the
requirement of consent from the Official Assignee or the court
before leaving New Zealand, restrictions on employment in certain
positions and restrictions on obtaining credit over $100. Based on
these onerous conditions and the lack of empirical evidence to sug-
gest that students are currently abusing the bankruptcy process, no
attempts have been made to introduce an exception to discharge for
student loans under the Student Loan Scheme. At the same time, in
the context of the proposed "no-asset procedure", because there is
less stigma, a shorter term and fewer restrictions than bankruptcy,
there is a fear that students will resort to the process only to discharge
their student debt. The government predicts that by preventing the
discharge of student loan debt under the Student Loan Scheme in a
"no-asset procedure", 250 debtors will be affected.75 All other
provable debts (apart from debts which are non-dischargeable in
bankruptcy, such as child maintenance orders) will be dischargeable
through the "no-asset procedure".76
4. Increasing Number and Value of Student Loans
In all of the countries under review, claims surrounding abuse of
the bankruptcy process by students proliferated with an increase in
the number and the value of government-funded student loans. This
fear-of-increasing-abuse rationale led, in all countries except New
Zealand, to the enactment of nondischargeability provisions as a
response to the rising number and value of student loans, and the
expected rise in associated defaults.
As noted above, leading up to the enactment of the nondis-
chargeability provision in the United Kingdom in 2004, the number
of students claiming bankruptcy had dramatically increased from
eight in 1992 to 899 in 2003.17 There were also proposals to increase
75. See New Zealand Ministry of Education, "A Guide to the Student Support Changes"
(May 2004), online at A Guide to the Student Support Changes <http://www.mine-
du.govt.nz/web/downloadable/d19643_v 1/9643-student-support-guide.pd f> (date
accessed: August 4, 2005).
76. See Ministry of Economic Development, "Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill:
Discussion Document" (April 2004), online at Draft Insolvency Law Reform Bill:
Discussion Document <http://www.med.govt.nz/ri/insolvency/review/draft-bill/dis-
cussion/index.html> (date accessed: August 4, 2005).
77. Supra, footnote 63, col. 571.
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tuition fees and abolish upfront fees, which would necessitate the
need for greater student loan support. 8 In anticipation of this
increased demand, the United Kingdom opted to exempt student
loans from bankruptcy.
In Canada, prior to the introduction of the nondischargeability
provision in 1997, the number of student loan defaults increased
from only 9% in 1980 to 17% in 1990."9 In 1997 when the nondis-
chargeability provision was introduced, the government had report-
edly lost $70 million in 1996-1997 from Government Student
Loans in bankruptcy, up from $30 million in 1990-1991. 0 In 1990-
1991, 223,505 full-time students received federal Government
Student Loans with an average value of $2,863.1 In comparison, in
1996-1997, 343,22482 full-time students received federal
Government Student Loans with an average value of $4,615.83 This
represented an increase of 53.6% in the number of borrowers and a
61.2% increase in the average value of the loans received during
that period.
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 first
excepted student loans from bankruptcy. One goal of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was to rescue "the student loan
program from fiscal destruction"." From 1978 to 1981, the per-
centage of students with student loans more than doubled from 15%
78. L. Dearden et al., Higher Education Funding Policy: Who Wins and Who Loses? A
Comprehensive Guide to the Current Debate (London, The Institute for Fiscal Studies,
2005), p. 1.
79. Schwartz, supra, footnote 34, at p. 317.
80. Ibid., at p. 318.
81. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, "Evaluation of the Canada
Student Loans Program" (1997), online at Profile of Canada Student Loan Program
<http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/asp/gateway.asp?hr=/en/cs/sp/edd/reports/1997-
000340/pageO6.shtml&hs=cxp> (date accessed: August 4, 2005) (HRSDC).
82. Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, "Number of Canada Student
Loans Borrowers for 1996-1997 (Full-Time Students Only)", online at Canada
Student Loans Program Statistics <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/asp/gateway.asp?hr=/
enlhip/cslp/statistics/03 stBorrowers 1996.shtml&hs=cxp> (date accessed: August 4,
2005). :.
83. Human R~sources and Skills Development Canada, "Average Dollar Amount of
Negotiated Canada Student Loans (CSL) Full-Time Students Only", online at Canada
Student Loans Program Statistics <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/asp/gateway.asp?hr=/enl/
hip/cslp/statistics/10st DollarAmount.shtml&hs=cxp> (date accessed: August 4, 2005).
84. R. Roots, "The Student Loan Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences"
(2000), 29 Sw. U.L. Rev. 501 at p. 512.
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to 33%.15 Federal outlays for the program grew from $500 million
in 1978 to $2.3 billion in 1981.86 Legislative amendments, 7 which
promoted increased accessibility to higher education and raised
tuition fees charged by colleges,"5 prompted the increase in student
loans.
Although New Zealand still permits government-funded student
loans to be discharged in bankruptcy, the government is currently
experiencing an increase in the number of student loans that are
written off each year. In 2002, total student debt owing to the
government amounted to over $5 billion, with only one in ten
students debt-free.89 The New Zealand University Students'
Association estimates that by 2020 total student debt in New
Zealand will rise to almost $20 billion, an amount the country's
Auditor General believes could be "potentially a major source of
risk" to New Zealand's national government. 90 In June 2004,
$8.5 million in student loans was written off for 542 borrowers
compared to $3.5 million for 326 borrowers in June 2003. 9'
5. Protecting the Public Interest:
Recipient of Benefit Should Pay
The legislative debates and government reports coming out of the
countries under review reveal a consensus that students, as the pri-
mary beneficiaries of higher education, should be required to con-
tribute to the cost of their education through tuition fees. This line
of reasoning has been used in the bankruptcy context to claim that
students should not be able to skirt these contributions by using
bankruptcy to discharge loans incurred to cover the costs of educa-
tion. Policies that oblige students to contribute financially to their
85. Ibid., at p. 506.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., at p. 505. See for example, the Higher Education Act 1965, 1965 PL 89-329, and
the Middle Income Student Assistance Act, 1978 PL 95-566 (which extended student
loan benefits to Americans regardless of household income. Prior to that only house-
holds with an income of less than $25,000 were eligible for loans under the Higher
Education Act: ibid., at note 19).
88. Ibid.
89. New Zealand University Students' Association, "The Student Loan Scheme:
Inequities and Emerging Issues" (Wellington, 2002).
90. Ibid.
91. New Zealand, "Annual Report Student Loan Scheme" (October 2004), online at
Annual Report Student Loan Scheme 2004 <http://www.studylink.govt.nz/pdf/2004/
sls-annual-2004.pdf> (date accessed: August 5, 2005) at p. 34 (Annual Report N.Z.).
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education and prohibit the discharge of student loans in bankruptcy
are justified on the basis of protecting the public interest, namely
taxpayer dollars that are used to finance student loan programs.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the rationale for the Labour
Party's proposal to increase tuition fees is that students, who derive
substantial benefits from their education, should be required to con-
tribute to the cost of their education.2 The Labour Party is also rec-
ommending a variable fee rate that reflects the different economic
benefits derived from various courses of study. 3 Furthermore, in
support of the Higher Education Act 2004, which effectively
removed student loans from bankruptcy, the House of Commons
Standing Committee expressed concerns about protecting the pub-
lic interest, specifically taxpayer dollars that are used to fund the
student loan program.94
In Australia, prior to 1989, students were not required to pay any
tuition fees. John Dawkins, the Labour Minister of Education at the
time, believed that this policy constituted an unfair subsidy to the
rich by the poor.95 Therefore, the Australian government enacted a
system of deferred contributions, which required students who
stood to benefit from their education to pay a portion of the cost.96
Directly linked to this system was the creation of a partial exception
to discharge for outstanding student contributions.
In the United States and Canada, rhetoric similar to that used in
the United Kingdom and Australia surrounding the private benefit
of an education may be found in the legislative debates. In addition,
American and Canadian courts have often invoked this rhetoric in
denying judicial applications for relief. In the United States, courts
often consider whether the student benefited from her education
when determining whether the debtor has satisfied the undue hard-
ship test.97 If a debtor has secured employment in her chosen field,
it is less likely that the court will grant a discharge of the debtor's
student loans.
92. U.K., Secretary of State for Education and Skills, "The Future of Higher Education"
(By Command of Her Majesty, 2003) at p. 83.
93. Ibid.
94. Supra, footnote 63, col. 578.
95. A. Usher, Much Ado About a Very Small Idea: Straight Talk on Income Contingent
Loans (Toronto, Educational Policy Institute, 2005), p. 3.
96. Ibid.
97. Frattini, supra, footnote 51, at pp. 553 and 566.
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In Canada, the Honourable Bob Rae has stated,
While there is unquestionably a significant social benefit to higher education
that should be recognized by a stronger commitment to public funding, there
is also an important private benefit to the student and the graduate. It is only
reasonable for students to pay part of the cost. Otherwise we would be ask-
ing taxpayers who don't go [to university or college] to subsidize those
who do.98
In the bankruptcy context, in some instances Canadian courts have
translated this sentiment into a consideration of whether a debtor
has derived an economic benefit from her education when deter-
mining if an application for relief from the exception to discharge
should be granted. For example, in Allen (Re),99 the applicant was
denied a discharge because she had secured employment in her
chosen field and thus had derived an economic benefit. However, in
Swann (Re),"'0 the applicant was not successful at obtaining
employment in her chosen field and therefore was granted a dis-
charge. The application of this principle has, however, been incon-
sistent and the courts have often overlooked other life circum-
stances that impact financial hardship. For example, in Allen (Re),
the court downplayed the fact that, although the applicant had
obtained employment, she suffered from a disability that prevented
her from working full-time hours.''
6. Development of Securitization Markets
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the ability to
access public capital markets to fund government-funded and guar-
anteed student loans through securitization has played a role in
shaping an increasingly restrictive exception to discharge for stu-
dent loans. It is the case that in the context of student loan securiti-
zation, increasing the restrictive exception for discharge would only
be expected to have a positive impact on funding costs if student
loan defaults were a material problem. To this point in the article it
has been argued that there is no justification for the claim that such
defaults are a material problem. The argument that is made here
with respect to securitization is based on the emergence of a
powerful new set of stakeholders involved in the securitization
98. Rae Review, supra, footnote 28, at pp. 23-24.
99. Allen (Re), 2000 CarswellOnt 4167 at para. 6 (Gen. Div.).
100. Swann (Re), 2001 CarswelIBC 1959 at para. 12 (Master).
101. Allen, supra, footnote 99, at para. 3.
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industry. This "new" group of stakeholders is relying on the unsup-
ported rhetoric and perception surrounding student loan default to
push for an increasingly restrictive exception as an alternative or
concurrent strategy with building the perceived probability of
default into existing pricing models.
In the United States, the existence of a securitization market likely
played a role in extending the exception to private student loans,
and in the United Kingdom, in introducing an exception for
government-funded student loans. The American asset-backed
securities market is the world's largest, although the asset-backed
securities market has been growing rapidly around the globe.
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, for
example, have all witnessed the introduction of asset-backed
securities. However, currently only the United States and the United
Kingdom appear to have developed markets for the securitization of
student loans. Canada appears to be moving in the direction of
developing a securitization market for student loans.
Securitization of student loans refers to the process where an
entity pulls together student loans and then sells the rights to those
receivables to investors in the form of securities. 2 This process
generally takes place through the establishment of a trust, referred
to as a special purpose vehicle, which acquires the student loans
from the originators of the student loans. 03 The trust then issues
debt securities or other interests to investors,' °4 which are secured by
the student loan notes acquired, related government guarantees
and/or subsidies of the student loans. The cash that the trust receives
from investors is used to pay the originator of the loans for the loans
purchased.' °5 The trust collects the cash generated by loans and dis-
tributes it to security holders over time."°
Securitization is beneficial to transferors because they can obtain
funds at a more favourable interest rate that does not take into
account the bankruptcy risk of the originator of the loans.' 7 Rather
than considering the credit rating of the originator of the loans,
102. J.L. Debruin, "Corporate Law: Recent Developments in and Legal Implications of
Accounting for Securitizations" (1999), Ann. Surv. Am. L. 367 at p. 368.
103. Ibid., at p. 369.
104. Ibid.
105. Dominion Bond Rating Service, online at us Student Loan ABS <http://www.dbrs.
com/web/sentry?coMp=2900&Docld=147792> (date accessed: July 15, 2005) (DBRS).
106. Ibid.
107. Debruin, supra, footnote 102, at p. 370.
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investors need only look to the cash flow from the loans themselves
in evaluating the risk for the investment.08 An equally important
reason for originators of loans to engage in securitization is the
favourable accounting treatment of such transactions.'°9 Off-balance-
sheet financing rules allow the transferor to increase liquidity and
lower the debt-to-equity ratio as a result of the transaction. "
In the United States, securitization of government guaranteed
student loans amounted to a $34 billion business in 2004."' Capital
markets do not play a direct role in directly financed government
student loans in the United States."I2 A number of secondary market
institutions are involved in purchasing and packaging for sale stu-
dent loans from originators of government guaranteed student loans
who choose not to keep the loans on their books."3 The Student
Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae) is both the largest issuer
of student loan asset backed securities and the largest private source
of funding, delivery and servicing for student loans in the United
States."4 Sallie Mae issues student loan asset backed securities
backed by both government guaranteed and private student loans."5
In 2004, Sallie Mae issued 12 deals totaling approximately
$26 billion." 6 Nelnet Education Loan Funding Inc., which recently
purchased Edulinx, the entity contracted to service federal and
some provincial Government Student Loans in Canada, stood next
in line with four deals totaling over $5 billion."7
Initially when the U.K. government introduced tuition fees, the
government offered students mortgage-style loans. In five years it
had built up a debt portfolio of £3 billion. The U.K. government
faced a similar challenge to the one that Canadian governments will
face if there is a move from our current mortgage-style government-
funded student loan system to an income-contingent model: What
should be done with the existing loans? In 1998 and 1999, the U.K.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., at p. 371.
110. Ibid.
111. DBRS, supra, footnote 105.
112. Ibid., at p. 2.
113. Ibid.
114. Nomura, "Student Loan ABS 101" (January 26, 2005), online at <http://www.securiti-
zation.net/pdf/Nomura/StudentLoan-26Jan05.pdf> (date accessed: August 8, 2005) at
p. 8.
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government addressed this question by selling £2 billion of the U.K.
government's student loan portfolio to the private sector. Each
transaction involved the sale of approximately £1 billion in student
loans owing to the government."8 In both instances, the Student
Loan Company Limited, a non-profit company, wholly owned by
the U.K. government, was contracted to administer the portfolios.
One of the contracts to service the student loans sold to the private
sector was renewed and the other was discontinued in 2004." 9 The
1998 transaction involved the securitization of student loans. In that
transaction 300,000 student loans granted to those who entered
post-secondary education before September 1, 1998 were trans-
ferred to Honours Student Loans, a special purpose vehicle set up
by Honours Trustee Limited, a company formed jointly by
Deutsche Bank and the Nationwide Building Society.'20 Honours
Trustee Limited paid £1 billion to the U.K. government for these
loans.' 2 ' Given that the Student Loan Company Limited operates as
a business and must account to the Department of Education and
Skills for its performance, the accounting treatment resulting from
the sale of the student loans was likely a key motivating factor in
the sale of the student loans.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND ISSUES FOR
FURTHER CONSIDERATION
This section puts forward recommendations and issues for fur-
ther consideration concerning the justifications for the exception to
the bankruptcy discharge, the reform process and the substance of
reforms to the current exception. These recommendations have
been formulated with a view to the pattern of convergence in the
treatment of government-funded student loans in bankruptcy that
has been observed in the common law jurisdictions under review, as
well as the events and circumstances that have triggered legislative
measures in those jurisdictions. It is important to note at the outset
that Canada appears to be the only jurisdiction that is taking seri-
ously proposals to make the exception to discharge in bankruptcy
for student loans less restrictive. For this reason, the other countries
118. Student Loan Company, "Annual Report and Accounts 2003-2004, Delivery in the
Future", online at Annual Report 2003-2004 <http://www.slc.co.uk/pdf/annualre-
port2004.pdf> (date accessed: August 4, 2005) at p. 3.
119. Ibid.
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under review are paying close attention to the Canadian proposals
and developments. Accordingly, the implications of Canada's
choices are far-reaching and hold significance beyond the national
context.
Current policy and legislative proposals for reforming the treat-
ment of student loans in bankruptcy in Canada merely attempt to
tweak the waiting period attached to the exception and the ability to
make an application for relief. Absent from these proposals and
legislation is a consideration of the substantive features of the
exception and an evaluation of the justifications for these features.
In particular, current proposals and legislation do not address the
soundness of the key premises underlying the current exception:
(a) student abuse of the bankruptcy process; and (b) the need to pro-
tect the public interest. The findings in this article suggest that these
premises are unfounded. Provision is made in Statute c. 47, and
supported by earlier government reports, for reduction in the wait-
ing period for the inapplicability of the exception and for obtaining
relief from the exception. In the short term, this may resolve some
of the tensions in the existing system. However, this does not
represent a long-term solution.
1. Recommendations
(a) Public Interest and Abuse Justifications for Exception are
Unsubstantiated
A common theme in each of the jurisdictions considered, except
New Zealand, is the political motivation behind the introduction or
increased restrictiveness of the exception to discharge for govern-
ment-funded or guaranteed student loans: the exception to dis-
charge makes more palatable the figures documenting the rising
costs of post-secondary education. Ironically, the increase in the
number and value of student loans is the direct result of the goal of
democratizing post-secondary education. Policy-making in the
bankruptcy context has operated in opposition to this goal by dis-
counting the social gains of an education and constructing educa-
tion as a private benefit. The move to impose an increasingly
restrictive discharge has followed from anecdotal stories about
alleged abuses offered by politicians and those representing certain
private interests, even in the face of the availability of empirical
data that suggests such stories are either altogether apocryphal or
9-44 C.B.L.J.
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relate to a statistically insignificant number of cases. Saul
Schwartz's study provides a good empirical platform in the
Canadian context to challenge these stories.12 Similarly, a review of
all the reported applications for relief from the exception to dis-
charge provides an alternative source of narratives that also chal-
lenges the dominant accounts of student abuse in the bankruptcy
process. 121
Directly linked to accounts of student abuse used to justify the
current exception are claims that because the government is the
creditor at issue, it is in the public's interest for the government to
be given special treatment for these debts. This public interest jus-
tification has been rejected in numerous jurisdictions that have
recently dispensed with the Crown's priority status in bankruptcy.
While historically Crown priority for payment of debts was rooted
in the theory that the "King could do no wrong", this principle is
being abandoned globally. 24 In this context, claims centred on the
protection of the public purse have been discounted on the grounds
that if a debtor cannot obtain a fresh start (or in the corporate con-
text - reorganize) the debtor will not be able to pay future debts to
federal, provincial and local governments and will become a burden
on them. There is a growing recognition that the quality of neigh-
bourhoods, communities, the environment and retirement may be at
stake in decisions as to whether to protect the public purse by abol-
ishing or granting Crown priority.
Importantly, in the current context, as is discussed in the section
on securitization above, any special treatment based on the public
interest flowing from the government's identity as the creditor
needs to be carefully evaluated. In the American context, the
identity of the government as the creditor was used to justify an
exception for student loans that has just been expanded to private
lenders outright. On this basis, the National Bankruptcy Conference
opposes the amendment to the nondischargeability provision.
Specifically, the conference has stated: "The justification typically
provided for excepting government insured loans from discharge
does not apply to private loans made by for-profit institutions. For-
122. Schwartz, supra, footnote 34.
123. Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 5.
124. For a broader discussion of these reforms and the current status of the government in
bankruptcy in Canada see S. Ben-Ishai, "Technically the King Can Do Wrong in
Reorganizing Insolvent Corporations: Evidence from Canada" (2004), 13 Intl. Insolv.
Rev. I (Ben-Ishai 2004).
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profit institutions extend credit at market rates and on the same
basis as every other lender.'
25
Originally, one justification for the current nondischargeability
provision was to provide protection to non-profit and governmental
entities, so that they could issue student loans and not harm the pub-
lic purse.'26 When the amendment to expand the exception to "for
profit" lenders was first proposed, the American Bankers
Association and Consumer Bankers Association Task Forces on
Bankruptcy asserted, "this proposed change simply suggests that if
sufficient political pressure can be generated, a special interest
group can obtain special treatment under the bankruptcy law".1
27
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the sale of directly funded
government student loans to the private sector likely played a role
in introducing the exception to discharge for these loans.
Given the involvement of Nelnet Education Loan Funding Inc.
with the federal government student loan program and a number of
provincial student loan programs in Canada, it appears that the
development of a securitization market for these loans is imminent.
Careful consideration needs to be given to the benefits of accessing
public markets in this way. In particular, it will be necessary to
evaluate whether such a market may be created without an exception
to discharge for Government Student Loans. The U.K. model sug-
gests that this is possible. The securitization of government-funded
student loans in the U.K. took place prior to the introduction of an
exception to discharge for government-funded student loans. At the
same time, it is likely that once the securitization market was created,
the private entities involved in this market played a significant role
in shaping the policy that led to the enactment of the exception to
discharge for government-funded student loans. In the United States,
which has the most developed securitization market, the private enti-
ties involved in this market played a significant role in shaping the
exception to discharge that now includes private student loans.
In the Canadian context, the role that players in the securitization
market will have in shaping bankruptcy policy must be considered.
An argument can be made that investment in student loans through
125. Report of National Bankruptcy Conference on Titles I-III of the Bankruptcy
Legislation, 2001 WL 770326, 96 (Nat'l Bankr. Confr. 2001), cited in Hennessy, supra,
footnote 45.
126. Hennessy, ibid., at p. 92.
127. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 150 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6111 cited
in Hennessy, ibid., at p. 92.
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the securitization market serves the public interest in increasing
liquidity in the student loan market and increasing the total funding
available to make student loans. However, there are a number of
criticisms that can be levelled against the securitization of student
loans. Importantly, we do not want to find ourselves in a situation
where the driving force in developing bankruptcy policy is the issue
of how best to facilitate the securitization market at the expense of
taking into account the implications for other stakeholders impacted
by these policies. For example, along the same line, student groups
in Canada have argued that the 1998 amendment to the Canadian
exception to discharge can be attributed to the banks' participation
in the federal student loan program during this period and the
government's desire to appease them. 28
(b) Abolish the Exception
In light of the findings that the two key justifications for the
exception to discharge for Government Student Loans are unsub-
stantiated, this section puts forward the argument that the exception
to discharge should be abolished. The onus should be placed upon
the government to oppose discharges where financial hardship
would not result from continued payment of Government Student
Loans and/or where bad faith can be demonstrated. In this way, the
nine-month bankruptcy period could be extended where appropriate
and a model more akin to the model in place in Australia and in
New Zealand may be implemented. A key benefit of this approach
is that bankruptcy registrars would be relieved of their role in mak-
ing decisions surrounding student hardship that they currently must
make in applications for relief from the exception.
The Canadian model attempts to achieve what the Australia and
New Zealand system accomplish through a longer bankruptcy
process and the possibility for administrative hearings related to
student hardship through the tax system. However, it fails for two
reasons. First, with the 10-year waiting period, the exception intro-
duces an inconsistency in the duration of the bankruptcy process for
debtors with student loans and debtors without student loans. In
Australia and New Zealand, because bankruptcy is a three-year
period, the same concerns surrounding quick downloading of
student loans through bankruptcy do not exist. The 10-year waiting
128. Membership Advisory, supra, footnote 11, at p. 2.
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period before students can apply for relief from the exception to dis-
charge attempts to address this concern in the Canadian context.
However, unlike the approach taken in New Zealand and Australia,
this is inconsistent with the decision on the length of the bankruptcy
process. That is, at a minimum in Canada the bankruptcy period for
bankrupts with student loans is essentially 10 years compared with
the nine-month period for most bankrupts.
A second problem with the exception is that it places on bank-
ruptcy registrars the burden of making decisions about student
hardship, without providing any guidance as to how to make these
decisions. In jurisdictions such as Australia, such decisions are
administrative decisions under the taxation scheme, for which there
is a large body of precedent on which to draw. Bankruptcy registrars
in Canada have no such body of precedent for student loan deci-
sions. No other exception to the bankruptcy discharge in Canada
provides for an exception to its application on good faith and
financial hardship grounds. For these reasons and because of the
procedural and substantive obstacles in bringing an application for
relief, the current role played by bankruptcy registrars is ineffective.
Given both the American and the Canadian experience with appli-
cations for relief from the exception, where decisions are inconsis-
tent and limited relief is provided, a better approach would be to
place the onus on the government to oppose a former student's dis-
charge in appropriate cases.
The proposed approach is essentially a return to the Canadian
model in place between 1992 and 1997. In 1992, the government's
preferred status in bankruptcy was removed, consistent with a
broader trend in other jurisdictions to limit the priority status of the
Crown.1 29 When the preference was taken away from the govern-
ment, the government argued that there was little to be gained from
objecting to a bankrupt's discharge since it had to share any recov-
ery with the bankrupt's other unsecured creditors. The government
claimed that it experienced significant losses as a result of its gen-
eral unsecured position and the increasing number of students who
were going bankrupt with unpaid Government Student Loans. As
has already been discussed, the data demonstrate that while default
on student loans and bankruptcies may increase with an increasing
number and value of student loans, there is no empirical evidence
129. For a broader discussion of this reform and the current status of the government in
bankruptcy see Ben-Ishai 2004, supra, footnote 124.
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of abuse of the bankruptcy process. Accordingly, closing the door to
bankruptcy as a means to confront the costs associated with
democratizing post-secondary education is not the solution. Further,
unlike the situation prior to 1997, mandatory surplus income
payments are now required for high-income debtors during the
nine-month bankruptcy period 3' and Statute c. 47 will extend that
period. 3' While the government would have to share any recovery
with other unsecured creditors, the possibility for greater recovery
remains through income contributions during the bankruptcy
period, which for high-income debtors looks similar to lengthier
bankruptcy periods in Australia and New Zealand. Further, while
this approach may result in increased monitoring and litigation
costs in relation to student loans, these costs would presumably out-
weigh the costs of distress suffered by existing students who cannot
discharge their Government Student Loans.
As there were few cases between 1992 and 1997 where the
government opposed a bankrupt's discharge on account of unpaid
Government Student Loans, it is difficult to evaluate the role that
bankruptcy registrars played in that period in relation to student
loans. In order to avoid an unpredictable and inconsistent system if
the exception is abolished, the government must issue a bulletin as
to its policy and criteria for opposing discharges on the ground of
outstanding Government Student Loans.
2. Issues for Further Consideration
(a) The Provability of Government Student Loans
An issue that has not arisen in the Canadian context concerns the
provability of Government Student Loans; it is unclear from a
review of both primary and secondary sources why this issue has
not been addressed. One possibility is that where Government
Student Loans are in a bankrupt's portfolio of debts, the distribution
from the bankrupt's estate to unsecured creditors is so low that the
issue does not have much economic significance. This possibility
130. See An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Companies Creditors'
Arrangement Act and the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1997, c. 12 and Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, Directive No. 11: Surplus Income (issued
October 30, 2000 and revised January 26, 2005), online at Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/intemet/inbsf-osb.nsf/en/
brO1055e.html> (date accessed: June 14, 2005).
131. Supra, footnote 41, s. 58.
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warrants further investigation in the current context. The rationale
behind the approach in Australia and in the United Kingdom
suggests that if the exception for Government Student Loans is
retained in Canada, the loans should not be provable in bankruptcy.
That is, since the government retains the prospect of repayment
because student loans are not extinguished in bankruptcy, it should
not be able to claim a share of the sale of the bankrupt's assets,
thereby reducing the amount available to other creditors who have
no future hope of repayment.
(b) The Treatment of Government Student Loans in a No-Asset
Procedure
It may be argued that the summary administration process,
currently in place under the BIA, is Canada's version of a no-asset
bankruptcy procedure. However, this process still includes a
number of features that distinguish it from the proposed no-asset
processes in New Zealand and the United Kingdom. One of the
most significant of these features is the high financial cost of going
bankrupt in Canada. If the Canadian exception to discharge for
Government Student Loans were to be abolished, such a decision to
abolish might subsequently require further consideration if a no-
asset procedure, similar to the U.K. or New Zealand model, is
implemented in Canada.
V. CONCLUSION
Drawing attention to the projected increase in the number and the
value of loans for post-secondary education funded by Canadian
federal and provincial governments, calls for reform to their treat-
ment in bankruptcy, and other jurisdictions' recent considerations of
the issue, this article set out to accomplish two goals. First, this
article has taken stock of a series of significant reforms over the
past decade with respect to the treatment of government-funded or
guaranteed student loans in the bankruptcy systems under review.
Second, given the options for dealing with student loans in bank-
ruptcy presented by these other jurisdictions, and Canada's willing-
ness to reassess its own choices, a number of recommendations and
issues for further exploration are put forward. In light of the experi-
ences of Canada and the other jurisdictions under review this
article's central recommendation relates to the conceptual framework
for considering the Canadian model for dealing with student loans
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in bankruptcy. That is, the two key justifications for the current
exception to discharge for government-funded student loans, student
abuse of the bankruptcy process and the need to protect the public
interest, should be put to rest, as they are unsubstantiated.
